University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Chancellor’s Honors Program Projects

Supervised Undergraduate Student Research
and Creative Work

Spring 5-2000

The Kyoto Protocol and a Marketable Pollution Permit System for
International Carbon Dioxide Emission Control: Why and How
They Must Function
Christopher James Raybeck
University of Tennessee - Knoxville

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj

Recommended Citation
Raybeck, Christopher James, "The Kyoto Protocol and a Marketable Pollution Permit System for
International Carbon Dioxide Emission Control: Why and How They Must Function" (2000). Chancellor’s
Honors Program Projects.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/425

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative
Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor’s
Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange.
For more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

AppendixD-

UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM
SENIOR PROJECT - APPROVAL

N a me:

~~J~~~tk~------------------------------------------

College:

~~_~__s..c~~,:::~_______

Fa cu 1ty

Men tor:

P ROJE CT

TITLE:

Oep ortmen t:

~i~~_+£'!-"~!':'J£'-_____

k~-~~.i~~-?±~J.:r------------------------------
Jh~_l(¥-~_R~-h~~_:~~_--,,=- __~~l(~~~l~j~dJJ,,_Y.:h~L

fg'[!~/±_}1~f!~_'f>~~J~1t~~~'0~~~_~~kl).!__ !>l~'li~~_§'~J:.~~__~~~~_'.__

~n/-~~--~~--~1--~Y~±-~~~~~~-------------------------I have reviewed this completed senior honors thesis with this student and certify
that it is a project commensurate with honors level undergraduate research in this
field.

r,

?f:--7~---~-~"-~fy-------,

Signed:
Date:

Faculty

Mentor

-----I-J-Q-L-~cj_~:!__

Comments (Optional):

7'(f4

q {/1

i
:ilk! ;4'1/X
C/ rf' c__1 - l{e r /1 '(~ I

vvllJ

fafl

J

c,,\

"
(rl

27

,/

c:I£vp&

J}v ~rz

~C/d

If

UNIVERSITY HONORS PROGRAM
SENIOR PROJECT - PROSPECTUS

AppendixC-

_(¥~l~-~~~~---------------------------------------

Name:

Coli ege:

ih±s_~--~~~~~~-------

Faculty

~entor:

PROJECT

TITLE:

Dep artmen t:

~l&~_+.[~~~"~-----

~I~p_~~~__~l~-------------------------------
1},-,-__~!?__ q3!:b.o~__~__ ~__ ~~~~1Lf~<1ii-'L-

~':<:":'t!__ 5l"~__£i _lll.~~~,,~'tA__S::~~_ ):-1-0."-~!~- _!:'~;s0. . ~-~--"'~~ --

~~T-~--th~--~~r-1!~±--~~~~-------------------------PROJECT DESCRIPTION (Attach not more than one additional page, if necessary):

_ c:. ') ') i j\.I.~ ~+} 0 ,'I

'-hr

ad t,.~ c, ~ <, .J 'Wh r M~+h) 1\

S \J r~ <j;\ J)'(r

Ud~/)w'\ lID~'lk eW:(<;~~M r~cftot\

Projected

completion

Signed:

~w

Q

date:

f'-Q\J..

~l

1of-o -t;euJr

,

J ~('~ i

----------~r---------------------------

~k

-------~------------------------------------------

I have discussed this research proposal with this student and agree to serve in an
adv.isory role, as faculty mentor, and to certify the acceptability of the completed
proJect.
-'

:::~d: -t¥!r::~~~-~~£1J-'

Faculty

Mentor

Return this completed form to The University Honors Program, FlOl Melrose Hall,
974-7875, not later than the end of your 3rd year in residence.

26

The Kyoto

Protoco~:

Why and How It Must Be

Inp~e.mented

University of Tennessee Honors Program Senior Project
Chris Raybeck
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Denise Stanley

April 25, 2000

2

Abstract
Popular environmentalism has always focused on a few,

key

areas of concern, and, even as environmental issues and policy
begin to receive more public attention, these key areas remain
central to the platform of environmental protection, especially
on an international level. Among these is global warming. Caused
by a process known as the greenhouse effect, global warming is
fed by emission of certain gaseous pollutants and carries with it
an array of established, detrimental environmental consequences.
Primary among the greenhouse gases, as they are known, is carbon
dioxide. Though naturally emitted by many of the planet's
organisms, carbon dioxide is a major by-product of energy
consumption by both individuals and industry. As such, it is
essential in developing and maintaining the standard of living
currently enjoyed by millions and hoped for by millions more.
Consequently, the following question arises: Is curbing carbon
dioxide emission in order to stall and, ideally, prevent certain
negative effects due to global warming worth the economic
repercussions of such control? This question is, in fact,
presently in front of a number of nations considering
ratification of the recently-developed Kyoto Protocol, a treaty
initiating international reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.
While seemingly a rather straightforward cost-benefit
analysis, this paper attempts to show that the above question is
misleading and that, when striving to optimize aggregate social
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welfare, worldwide carbon dioxide emissions should be reduced.
The environment can be proven to be a valuable public good and,
therefore, international regulation makes sense economically as
well as environmentally.
The question at hand, then, transforms to one of how
emissions should be controlled in accordance with the Kyoto
Protocol. Governments may engage in three primary forms of
regulatory behavior - command-control techniques, taxation, or
maintenance of a pollution permit system. While each is generally
successful at controlling pollution, the latter is proven to be
the most efficient with respect to a free-market system and,
indeed, has been proposed by several Kyoto participants.
Extending standard permit system requirements developed
intranationally to international carbon dioxide regulation,
however, presents several novel concerns. These issues, which
include comparative advantage shifts, inequitable concentrations
of capital, and arrest of economic growth, generally result from
existing dichotomies between developed and developing countries.
Sensible solutions, such as recognition for reduced deforestation
and credit for investment in technological innovation, have been
proposed, however, and are examples of alternatives to direct
credit trading possible within the permit system. These
alternatives would allow it the flexibility to exist as the best
structure by which to reduce international carbon dioxide
emissions, permitting the benefits from the treaty to outweigh
the costs.

4

Introduction
Over the past several decades, society has seen the field
of environmental science popularized. Concern for natural
resource degradation has spread from portions of the scientific
and economic communities to the general public. As proof of this,
one only need note the increasing importance of definitive
environmental policy for an elected official; public policy
decisions are now quite often dependent upon an understanding of
environmental dynamics. Among the numerous popular environmental
issues is global warming. Now a political buzz phrase, global
warming, whose occurrence has finally been accepted as scientific
fact, is caused by a rather simple physical process. A solution,
however, especially considering political and economic arguments,
is not nearly as clear.
Global warming, caused by a process known as the greenhouse
effect, is the gradual warming of the planet's surface and
atmosphere. Though measured in averages of less than a degree
Celsius per year, this increase is enough to perhaps drastically
alter the environment's delicate homeostatic balance.

(Though

some emission-control opponents insist global warming is merely
one of the Earth's many climatic cycles, humans still perilously
spur the process by emitting enormous amounts of greenhouse
gases.) Projected consequences of this warming range from
climate-dictated shifts in agriculture to increased population
density in certain areas due to receding coastal land. Effects
can, in fact, then feed on themselves; temperature change can
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alter ocean current circulation, thus affecting further climate
change (Hammond 197; 1994). To compound these consequences,
flooding, crop loss, and the like will be most prevalent in those
countries least equipped to handle them - developing countries.
The greenhouse effect is so named because of its mechanistic
similarity to an actual botanical greenhouse. According to Oxtoby
et al, the process, outlined below, is well-understood (598;
1996). certain gaseous molecules are released constantly into the
atmosphere, from both natural and anthropogenic sources. Visible
sunlight (energy) from the sun that is allowed to pass through
the Earth's upper atmosphere is either absorbed by the planet's
surface or reflected back through the atmosphere into space in
the form of infrared radiation (still, energy). However, the
greenhouse gases, which include carbon dioxide,
chlorofluorocarbons, methane, nitrous oxide and water vapor, trap
much of the irradiated energy meant for space due to their high
infrared absorption spectra. It is this chemical characteristic
that allows greenhouse gases to work, in a sense, as a thin
thermal blanket covering the planet. An obvious deduction is the
positive correlation between levels of greenhouse gases and
energy entrapment, thus leading to the notion that increasing
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will only speed
global warming.
Accounting for approximately fifty-seven (57) percent of
total greenhouse gas accumulation as of 1990, carbon dioxide is
the most prominently emitted greenhouse gas (CNN.com; 1999). Its
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sheer rate of annual atmospheric accumulation from anthropogenic
sources, estimated in 1993 at five (5) trillion kilograms of
total carbon (Miller et al 211; 2000), compounded with its
particularly wide infrared absorption range, makes carbon dioxide
the most potent contributor to global warming. If society seeks
to curtail and prevent and further effects of global warming, a
global reduction in carbon dioxide emissions must be the focus of
not only the scientific and economic communities but the
international community as a whole.
Carbon dioxide is a by-product of the burning of fossil
fuel, the primary source of energy throughout the world, and
deforestation and similar erosive practices. It is estimated that
every gallon of gasoline burned releases approximately twenty-two
(22) pounds of carbon dioxide (CNN.com; 1999). Therefore, given
the obvious economic and social importance of the many processes
that produce carbon dioxide and the seemingly distant
consequences of global warming, the following question arises:
Would it truly be beneficial to limit emission? After all,
citizens of developed countries rely on the ability to
unabashedly emit carbon dioxide as a result of high energy
consumption in order to maintain a lofty standard of living;
citizens of developing countries rely on the potential for
increased energy production as a step toward economic
development. The slowing effect a reduction in carbon dioxide
emission would have on economic pace is, therefore, not
surprising. Nevertheless, the biological necessity for emission
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control is obvious; however, the economic feasibility, indeed
necessity, can be proven without much difficulty.

Economic Justification for Environmental Integrity
The ultimate goal of economics on the individual level is
the maximization of utility, an abstract concept used as a
measure of happiness. For all goods there is some preferred level
of consumption that is optimal based on the particular
individual's needs and desires and his or her ability to consume.
This concept may carefully be extended from ordinary goods
available for private purchase on an open market to public
commodities. Pollution and its consequences lower the value drawn
from the environment and, hence, lower utility. As utility is
lost, social welfare is decreased. Unfortunately, the fact that
someone else may gain from environmental destruction makes the
application of this concept to public goods tenuous.
Lack of pollution and its negative effects, however, seems
as if it should be an inherent part of human happiness in
general. Realistically, the utility one achieves from breathing,
for example, shOUld never be compromised by taking an extra
breath of clean air. So, controlling for all human needs and
desires beyond a clean environment, it becomes necessary from a
utility perspective to control carbon dioxide emissions.
Unfortunately, this argument does not fare well when faced with
the multitude of real human needs and desires.

Therefore, a

presentation of two additional arguments better rooted in
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practicality and more able to withstand the wide array of human
preferences follows.
One argument centers on certain legal practices concerning
property rights common in some English-born systems as its
defense against high levels of pollution. According to Kula,
English common law (and, consequently, certain countries of
Anglo-Saxon origin) "recognizes only a limited and qualified
ownership of property" (183; 1994). More specifically, no entity
should be allowed to use air, land, or water in a manner that
could cause injury to others; this includes pollution. The
environment is, in a sense, a valuable public good whose
integrity is a right of everyone upon which no other may
infringe. Carbon dioxide emission to the extent that
environmental damage results, then, is a violation of the rights
of those not benefiting from its emission, and total social
benefits are reduced as the socially optimal level of pollution
is surpassed. The effectiveness or influence over actual emission
rates of this "common law solution" (Kula 183; 1994) may be
questionable, but it should at least be considered solid
rationale for the right to a clean environment. Of course, it
should be noted that the entire world does not share this English
notion of property rights.
Successful application of the final argument for carbon
dioxide emission control relies upon the accuracy of the
predictions of eventual physical harm to humans as a result of
global warming. Shue (1999) argues that the right of bodily

o
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integrity is non-marketable, a statement without any academic
doubt. As such, it is not the right of individuals today to
discount for current transgressions against, for example, the
environment, which have the very real potential to harm future
humans. Shue claims that "any of those predicted effects that
would constitute physical harm to human beings must be prevented
and may not be merely compensated for, no matter how great the
proposed compensation, if prevention is possible" (Dore 45;
1999). Therefore, legally and morally, little choice exists;
carbon dioxide emission, because it will lead to physical harm to
future humans, should be abated. In fact, an international
agreement to reduce carbon dioxide emissions is currently under
consideration.

The Kyoto Protocol
In 1992, approximately 150 nations met at an environmental
conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. At this conference, a
general goal was set to reduce international carbon dioxide
emissions. This goal was further articulated in a tangible treaty
known as the Kyoto Protocol developed in Kyoto, Japan. The 1997
agreement, which is currently under review for ratification by
most of the 168 participants, asks, among other things, for a
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of five

(5) percent 1990

levels during the initial commitment period of 2008 to 2012 from
most participants. Some developing countries such as Brazil,
China, Mexico, and India, however, are put under voluntary
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constraints due to political reasons. Additionally, a reliable
system to accurately determine anthropogenic emissions and,
hence, source countries is required to be in place by 2007
(CNN.com; 1997). The Kyoto Protocol, however, has met with
resistance, and countries, while most concede carbon dioxide
emission control of some form is necessary, disagree about how to
go about achieving - if at all - the treaty's goals.
Questioning exactly where emission cuts should be made,
debate over the Kyoto Protocol has split conference participants
roughly into two groups, developed countries and developing
countries, with the Unites States drawing opposition in certain
instances from both.

[The U.S., while identifying with other

developed countries, is responsible for approximately one-fifth
of global carbon dioxide emission (Montague 2; 1997) and,
therefore, has been more weary than other, smaller developed
countries of the treaty. This caution over economic well-being
has led to occasional disputes between the U.S. and these
countries.] Developed countries' concerns about altered
standards-of-living, concentrated in American opposition, is
joined by developing countries' concern that emission control
will retard fledgling and necessary economic growth. If the Kyoto
treaty is to become binding, a system of carbon dioxide control
that provides viable solutions to such concerns must be
suggested.

1A
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Emission Control
Assuming the above arguments are adequately persuasive, the
question of how to best control emissions now arises. First, it
is necessary to explore policies by which to control emissions in
general. Each abatement mechanism will later be compared to the
others, and a best fit for the specific case of international
carbon dioxide control will be determined. Realistically, three
options feasibly capable of eventually regulating global carbon
dioxide emission exist. Command-control devises are used by
governing bodies to assign pollution rates to individual industry
members. Just as the name indicates, the governing body
indirectly dictates to each firm a certain range of production
levels, as pollution rates are directly related to production.
Taxes can also be levied based upon pollution rates. The tax rate
is theoretically set to force firms to maintain some pre-chosen
socially optimal level of pollution; portions of the tax revenue
go to help clean up the environment. Tradable pollution permits
are the final option for pollution control. A certain level of
aggregate pollution is determined, transferred to a number of
permits, and allocated to all firms in the industry(ies), who can
then choose to use them or sell them on an open market. It is the
sense of this paper that, considering the arguments for
environmental protection and the fact that international
regulation of carbon dioxide makes sense economically, control
can best be achieved through a tradable pollution permit system
coupled with certain acceptable alternatives within the system.

11
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The Command-Contro1 Approach
The command-control approach to environmental regulation is
currently the most widely used method for pollution reduction
(Folmer et al 202; 1995). Its application is quite simplistic
when compared to the other two methods. A governing body
determines some type of environmental objective and, through laws
and regulation, forces firms to comply with its standard. After
evaluation of, obviously, environmental criteria and certain
technological, economic, and political criteria, a commandcontrol approach requires only a means of enforcement and
prosecution, as, of course, the other systems do.
The difficulty of a command-control approach surfaces in
choosing a specific environmental standard and then coordinating
that with technological capabilities, economic benefits, and
political concerns. Upon choosing an ecologically sound level of
pollution, the means to attain this level are compared to the
current technological capacity of the industry. Ideally, at least
some firms will have the capacity to meet the new regulatory
standard. Next, a rather simple cost-benefit analysis is run to
determine the actual economic costs of pollution abatement.
Finally, a political assessment of the regulation is made.
Regulations must be made simple enough to implement efficiently,
and some level of acceptability for the new laws must exist in
order to provide them legitimacy (Folmer et al 206; 1995).

1~
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Advantages of command-control include experience in other
fields, such as health and safety and labor and solidity of
requirement (Folmer et al 207; 1995). Regulations, due to the
extent they must be analyzed before being enforced, are difficult
to change. While this characteristic provides stability to the
regulated industry, its static nature is not able to adjust for
technological innovation. Enforcement, due to the nature of
international regulation, often becomes either costly or clumsy
or both, and the potential for corruption is present. Further,
the command-control is economically inefficient because the
individuality of cost structures of different firms is ignored.

Pollution Taxes
The second viable option for pollution control is a system
of environmental taxation. Known as Pigovian taxes, a tax rate is
determined by a governing body based upon the marginal costs of
abatement and damage to society. At the intersection of these two
cost curves is the socially optimal level of pollution (that is,
the level of pollution that causes injury not greater than the
benefits of polluting)

(Kula 185; 1994). Incurred by the

polluter, Pigovian taxes, carry more advantages and fewer
disadvantages with them than do command-control approaches.
Taxes paid are based on an individual firm's amount of
pollution production - the more one pollutes, the more one pays
in taxes. Automatically, then, taxes become geared toward the
individual cost structures of firms. A firm may choose to escape

1~
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taxes, or at least heavy taxes, by choosing a course of
substantial abatement. If a firm chooses not to rely on abatement
to reduce its tax burden, it must rely on technological
development. Innovations must be made which allow the firm to
keep constant its level of production, while polluting at a lower
rate. Hence, taxes can be, to an extent, termed efficient because
firms have an individualized choice about production. Firms with
the most efficient productive processes, in terms of low
pollution production, may emerge as market leaders.
Administratively, Pigovian taxes are no more difficult than
others to levy, also lending to their attractiveness (Kula 186;
1994). Though this ease of administration would be far from
evident given an international arena, a regulatory authority
would be better able to monitor aggregate national tax payments
than individual firm pollution as would be necessary with a
command-control approach.
Though taxes yield economically efficient results and are
relatively easy to administer, one primary disadvantage precludes
endorsement of such a system to achieve the goals of the Kyoto
Protocol. Taxes do not allow for a set level of pollution
release. As long as firms or countries pay taxes, they may
pollute as much as they want. This, obviously, is in direct
conflict with the treaty. Tax levying would not ensure a
sufficient reduction in carbon dioxide emission. Additionally,
taxes are, without perfectly inelastic supply curves, in some way

1 A
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passed on to consumers. This is, however, going to be true of any
system that affects a firm's production and, therefore, profits.

Tradable Pollution Permits

Command-control techniques are useful in attaining a
definitive level of pollution control, albeit often difficult and
costly to enforce; they are, however, very economically
inefficient. Pollution taxes come much closer to economic
efficiency but are not as able as command-control techniques to
achieve a specific target for pollution rates. Fortunately, a
method exists that combines the desirable qualities of each
approach (Kahn 75; 1998).
First proposed by Canadian economist J.H. Dales in 1968, a
system of tradable pollution rights is perhaps the most elegant
means by which a government may enforce pollution control.
Assuming a course of pollution abatement is decided upon,
tradable permits

~constitute

a theoretically ideal system"

(Folmer et al 220; 1995). Although anything is rarely ideal in
practice, marketable pollution permits better retain free-market
qualities and, thus, our idea of efficiency than either commandcontrol techniques or taxes. As a very general description of
tradable permits is given above, this section will attempt to
outline the core requirements and basic advantages and
disadvantages of a permit system.
Initially, the number of permits to be made available is
decided upon based on the desired level of pollution and are then

lC
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allocated to the polluters. Traditionally, permits are
grandfathered; that is, they are distributed free of charge to
polluters based upon an index of past pollution records. Such a
method implicitly assumes that initial environmental use rights
are conferred upon polluters (Folmer et al 220; 1995), a
condition satisfying the concept that everyone, in some small
part, owns environmental use rights (Dore 22; 1999). Permits may
also be auctioned to polluters, a practice that may favor too
heavily capital-rich entities, thus risking a less than equitable
initial allocation. Grandfathering, for its part, at least does
nothing to alter the status quo.
Simply controlling the amount of permits on the market is
inadequate, however. According to Folmer et al (1995), the
following are characteristics of a tradable permits system:
•

Government must be capable of enforcing the predetermined limit and prepared to prosecute violaters.

•

Some vehicle for trade is required. Just as any other
commodity, permits should be available for sell and
purchase via open market or private transactions. Any
entity, then, could conceivably trade permits - not just
polluters.

•

Because the total number of permits available is fixed,
new entrants to the market must attain necessary permits
from current holders; otherwise, it would be impossible
to retain the desired level of pollution.

1£
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•

In the interest of market stability, government must not
itself alter pollution

•

standards~

The door should be left open for the possible creation of
any substitutes for permit$ within the system.

(This

aspect will prove important in attempting to apply this
general permit system to a design for global carbon
dioxide emission control.
Tradable permits, as with taxesJ

allow £or as much economic

efficiency as possible given that certain regulations are,
indirectly, being enacted. For each firm, the marginal cost of
abatement is equilibrated with its demand for permits based on
their market price. Like taxes J

marketable permits allow for

firms to individually evaluate their cost structures and choose
the course of abatement that maximizes their profit$. Market
price of the permits is, per the basic tenants of a free-market
economy, based on supply and demand. Firms with low abatement
costs will choose to sell excess permits to compensate for their
abatement, and firms with high marginal costs will buy available
permits rather than reduce pollution rates.
The possibility of market power concentration and,
therefore, equity are issues with tradable permits. Firms with
readily available capital and already-high productive capacities
may engage in the hoarding of permits, thus preventing other
firms from producing because they cannot

Fol~ute~

The

possibility, then, that the system is not equitable arises.
However, regardless of these issues, a marketable pollution

1"7
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permits system is the most effective pollution control mechanism.
It combines the definitive pollutiQn standards of command-control
approaches with the economic efficiency and administrative ease
of pollution taxes.

Application of the Prototypical Tradable Permit System to Global
Carbon Dioxide Em1ssion Control
Having determined the most effective means of pollution
control, the tradable permit system must now be coalesced with
the needs of the international community in restricting carbon
dioxide emission. It begins as a rather simple process. As
proposed already by several nations, the establishment of a
marketable permit system would be regulated by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a branch of the united
Nations, and it would be responsible for regulation enforcement
per the Kyoto treaty (CNN.com; 1997). The countries participating
in the treaty would take the place of "firms" as discussed in the
above section Tradable Pollution Permits. However, applying this
general system as is currently used on national levels, would
create problems for the international community restricting
carbon dioxide emission. Equity issues as discussed above would
be of concern in addition to novel obstacles created by a global
system and the nature of carbon dioxide.
First, developing countries, in addition to certain small
developed countries, worry that a relative lack of capital would
prevent them from effectively competing in the open market for

10
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available pollution permits. This holds particular importance for
developing countries because of their reliance on increasing
energy production and, thus, carbon dioxide emission for economic
growth. Small developed countries worry about actors such as the
united States, by far the world's largest carbon dioxide
producer, whom they fear would claim the majority of permits. The
ability of entire countries to compete economically on an
international level could be crippled without the means to
produce sufficient energy. Shifts in comparative advantages might
also be of concern. As stated, the Kyoto treaty currently exempts
certain less-developed countries from mandatory regulation. with
some countries hampered by pollution control, others may be able
to manufacture certain key goods more efficiently. The current
global economic landscape could be permanently altered.
Therefore, the abolishment of any voluntary control is necessary
for equity concerns; all participants should be held to
definitive carbon dioxide restrictions.
The idea that the trading of international carbon dioxide
permits on an open market would not be totally efficient has been
put forth. Chichilnisky argues that, because permits involve the
use of a public good, a standard market as used for private goods
trading is inadequate (2; 1996). In a private goods market,
consumers are capable of choosing quantities of a good
independently of one another. Because carbon dioxide disperses
somewhat equivalently in the atmosphere given enough time
regardless of origin, consumers cannot choose amount of

10
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consumption (12; 1996). As such, she proposes that, essentially,
the market for permits needs help to attain efficiency and, to
accomplish this, suggests the creation an International Bank for
Environmental Settlements (IBES) as a regulatory body (7; 1996).
The IBES would perform functions such as setting a borrowing or
lending rate and aiding in the establishment of property rights
(9; 1996).

[Permits, for example, would be loaned rather than

sold; developing countries would not have to worry about
irreversibility of exchanges made with developed countries (25;
1996).] Chichilnisky's claims revolve around the assertion that
the marginal utility of abatement must be set equal to the
marginal utility of pollution rather than the standard
equilibration of marginal cost curves to attain efficiency (20;
1996) .
Whatever problems may be encountered by applying a tradable
permit system to international regulation of carbon dioxide
emission, it is important to remember the ultimate goal of such a
system and the Kyoto Protocol - the reduction of atmospheric
carbon dioxide levels - and the consequences of no regulation.
Ideally, regulation will force technological innovation to a
point that tight restriction no longer becomes necessary. Until
then, however, there are alternatives to permit trading within
the permit system that are feasible. If incorporated, these
alternatives, coupled with Chichilnisky's IBES regulation, would
create a successful, efficient, and equitable permit system.

"11\
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~ternatives

within the

Tradab~e

Permit System

The idea behind creating alternatives to emission credit
trading within the permit system revolves around the dynamics of
an international economic community and the fact than anyone
system of emission control, especially for carbon dioxide, will
not be perfectly equitable and efficient. Therefore, alternatives
are created that allow participants to get credit for required
emission reduction without having to compete for permits. Of
course, these alternatives are utilized in a manner that at least
compensates for non-existent permits. Two alternatives are
listed. One allows developing countries the opportunity to
circumvent some possible permit distribution issues, while giving
developed countries the opportunity to reduce emissions by
working with developing countries. still achieving the Kyoto
Protocol's ultimate goal of aggregate atmospheric carbon dioxide
reduction, the second alternative also provides developed
countries the opportunity to abate (from an aggregate, global
perspective) at a lower cost in their own country by cooperating
with developing countries.
As stated, developing countries are unwilling to
participate in an international permit system for concerns of
permit distribution rising from relative shortages of capital
with which to purchase needed permits. Certainly, because carbon
dioxide emission is currently such a large part of economic
growth, they are not willing to simply stop emitting practically
altogether. However, an alternative has been proposed that would

~1
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allow developing countries not only to satisfy Kyoto emission
requirements, but also provide environmental protection and the
potential for quota rents (Lopez et a l l ; 1998).

(Probably the

most effective alternative yet proposed, this alternative has
implications for not only

develop~ng

but also developed

countries.) Deforestation through burning, a known problem in
developing countries in particular, is estimated to produce
approximately twenty-one (21) percent of global carbon dioxide
(Lopez et al 3; 1998). Lopez argues that if developing countries
could receive emission credit for reducing the destruction
(through burning) of forestland, they would be better able to
achieve Kyoto's standards. In fact, Lopez estimates that if
deforestation rates were included in the initial allocation of
permits based upon past emissions, the Latin American "region as
a whole would acquire permits equivalent to more than 200% its
current emissions from industrial sources" (1; 1998). If they
then reduced deforestation rates, the income from selling extra
credits would more than surpass income lost from forest clearing,
and the potential for future growth would not be affected.
Another form of this alternative, known as a carbon offset
program, would allow investment in forests, utilizing their value
as carbon sinks. Already under way in trial fashion in Coast Rica
and Honduras, developed countries avoiding the purchase of a
permit on the open market would purchase a tract of forestland in
a developing country. The theory is simple; a country emits a
particular amount of carbon dioxide for which it has no permit.
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It then purchases a tract of forest that would have been
destroyed and maintains it to offset the carbon dioxide released.
It is estimated that one (1) hectare of healthy forest can absorb
up to ten (10) tones of carbon from the atmosphere per year
(Asumadu 3; 1998). This option, while giving more freedom in how
developed countries control carbon dioxide emissions, also
provides a measure of deforestation prevention and generates
capital for developing countries.
Finally, the most recently proposed alternative to
purchasing emission credits involves investing in research and
development ventures such as the World Bank's "Prototype Carbon
Fund". This appropriately named fund, launched in mid-January,
2000, is designed to encourage investment by countries in
technological research and projects aimed at reducing greenhouse
gas emissions in developing countries. Requiring at least a $5
million bid for participation, the Bank had as of late January
raised $85 million toward the $150 million cap.

(Hamilton E3;

2000). Investors so far include the governments of Finland, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden and power companies from Japan
and Belgium (Fialka A2; 2000). Financing a portfolio of fifteen
(15) to sixteen (16) projects over about three (3) years
(Hamilton E3; 2000), the fund targets developing countries
because of their low energy-efficient character. Cuts in
emissions can be achieved more cheaply than in developed
countries. For example, a project to reduce the amount of methane
produced by twenty-seven (27) dumps in Latvia by creating a
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waste-treatment facility, increasing recycling, and capturing the
gas to produce electricity has begun (Hamilton E3; 2000). Not
surprisingly, investors with the most interest come from highly
energy efficient countries. Savings of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions could reach close to $30 per ton by acting in
developing countries rather than their own. Any resulting
successful innovation would, of course, be carried over for
application in developed countries. The opportunity for
innovation investment as an alternative to permit trading allows
developed countries to help in world-wide emission reduction
while not sacrificing standard-of-living levels and gives
developing countries the chance for cleaner regional environments
and greater technological innovation at a relatively low cost.
Investing countries benefit by having an option to buying actual
permits on the market.

Conclusion
The future environmental condition of this planet is
constantly in peril as a result of human activity. One such
activity, the emission of vast quantities of carbon dioxide,
threatens global climate cycles with potentially disastrous
effects through a process known as the greenhouse effect. As an
attempt to intervene, 168 nations met in Kyoto, Japan to form a
treaty designed to regulate international carbon dioxide
emission. It can be certainly be demonstrated from a scientific
aspect that this was a step in the right direction; more
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importantly, this can also be shown economically. Attempting to
develop a method by which to control regulation, a system of
marketable pollution permits was proposed. Again, this can be
proven to be the best possible decision. However, for the Kyoto
Protocol to be most successful, all participants must be subject
to required emission control. This paper suggests as a regulatory
body the institution proposed by Chichilnisky and several
enumerated alternatives, specifically emission credit for halting
deforestation, the purchase of carbon sinks, and investment in
carbon funds, to permit purchase within the system. Given these
augmentations to the system, the treaty becomes an intelligent
resolution that should be ratified by all countries and
aggressively enforced.
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